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Abstract 
We analyze the effects of risks and learning on climate change decisions. A two-stage, 
dynamic, climate change stabilization problem is formulated. The explicit incorporation 
of ex-post learning induces risk aversion among ex-ante decisions, which is 
characterized in linear models by VaR- and CVaR-type risk measures. Combined with 
explicit introduction of “safety” constraints, it creates a “hit-or-miss” type decision-
making situation and shows that, even in linear models, learning may lead to either less- 
or more restrictive ex-ante emission reductions. We analyze stylized elements of the 
model in order to identify the key factors driving outcomes, in particular, the critical 
role of quantiles of probability distributions characterizing key uncertainties. 
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Endogenous Risks and Learning in Climate Change Decision 
Analysis 
Brian C. O’Neill  
Yurii Ermoliev  
Tatiana Ermolieva  
1.  Introduction 
Discussions of climate change policies are often framed as a choice between acting now 
or waiting until we know more about the problem (Manne and Richels, 1992; Webster 
2002; Wright and Erickson, 2003). The climate change policy dilemma poses a “hit-or-
miss” type of decision making situation. Emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) are 
associated with the production and consumption of goods and services, and the 
atmospheric concentration (stock) of these long-lived pollutants may cause irreversible 
damages. On one hand, postponing the reduction of GHG emissions may lead to 
potentially irreversible climate-related impacts, for example, reorganizations of large-
scale ocean circulation patterns or increased frequency of extreme weather-related 
events. On the other hand, if the problem turns out to be less severe than expected, the 
delay will avoid irreversible investments in capital for emissions abatement.  
These discussions are often supported by a traditional expected utility 
maximization model, suggesting either risk-averse ex ante (anticipative) decisions or 
risk-prone ex post (adaptive) decisions that are made only after receiving full 
information. If uncertainty about climate change is resolved over time, the robust 
strategy would definitely be to make only partial ex ante commitments and to keep 
options open until new information is revealed. This approach requires so-called two-
stage recourse stochastic optimization (STO) models (Dantzig and Madansky, 1961; 
Ermoliev and Wets, 1988; Kall and Wallace, 1994; Yastremskij 1983) incorporating 
both ex ante and ex post decisions within a single model. Accordingly, the climate 
change stabilization problem (Section 2) can be formulated as the choice of an ex ante 
risk reduction (stage 1) strategy over a random time horizon taking into account that it 
may need to be adjusted after new information is revealed (stage 2). This decision-
making framework implies, in particular, that the capacity for adaptive decision making 
in stage 2 has to be created ex ante.  
In economics literature, the importance of learning was first discussed in 
connection with irreversible investments in 1974 in Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry 
(1974) without an overall two-stage model being formulated. Arrow and Fisher (1974), 
Henry (1974), and Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) have concluded that when future 
damages are uncertain and irreversible, the ability to learn should lead to more active ex 
ante emission reductions. On the other hand, irreversibility of capital may lock an 
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economy into a wasteful use of resources. Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1976), Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), Ulph and Ulph (1997), and Pindyck (1999) showed that the ability to 
learn in this case should lead to less active ex ante emission reduction. These competing 
effects imply that the net effect of learning on ex ante decisions is an empirical question.  
Nordhaus (1994) and Kolstad (1996) examined the effects of learning by using 
empirically-calibrated integrated assessment models. They concluded that, in fact, 
learning has insignificant effects on ex ante abatement policies because the damage 
losses are not severe enough. A reason for this is that in most integrated climate and 
economics models, climate changes are considered as if they occur continuously and as 
if they can eventually be reversed through ex post adjustments (Wright and Erickson, 
2003). These models also use average damages (i.e., they cannot properly capture the 
effects of abrupt climate change and catastrophic risks (Ermoliev et al, 2000; O’Neill 
and Oppenheimer, 2002; Wright and Erickson, 2003)). A paper by Fisher and Narain 
(2003) analyzes a two-period model with risk characterized by a parameter introducing 
high or low climate change damages. Because overall impacts are evaluated by using 
expected values, the effects of capital irreversibility dominate catastrophic damages in a 
similar way to other models. Epstein (1980) demonstrated that the effects of learning on 
ex ante decisions depend in general on the convexity or concavity of marginal costs, 
which are very restrictive for climate change policy analysis (Ulph and Ulph, 1997). 
In this paper we take a different approach. Instead of using expected damages 
we explicitly introduce safety constraints by formulating the climate change problem 
within the framework of stabilization.  We develop a two-stage dynamic STO model 
and deliberately analyze only stylized linear versions of this model. We show that the 
combination of safety constraints and perspectives of learning induces potentially strong 
risk aversion among ex ante decisions that is characterized by quantile-based VaR and 
CVaR risk measures. As a result we show that, even with a linear net cost function, 
learning may lead to either less or more restrictive emission reductions, depending on 
mitigation costs and probability distributions describing key uncertainties.  
Section 2 characterizes climate change risk by the probability of total 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations exceeding a vital random threshold associated with 
potential ranges of global temperature. It outlines a two-stage dynamic climate change 
stabilization STO model with random durations of stages. In general, this model can be 
solved only numerically and therefore the key factors driving results are difficult to 
identify. For these reasons, we analyze only stylized aspects of the model; these provide 
a clearer picture of the various driving forces and show why the ability to learn in the 
future can lead to either less-restrictive or more-restrictive ex ante abatement policies 
today.  
Section 3 uses a very simple linear two-stage STO model to illustrate that the 
results from empirical models can be rather contradictory, because optimal solutions 
depend on complex nonsmooth interactions among ex ante and ex post decisions, costs, 
and probability distributions. In particular, they induce potentially strong risk aversion 
characterized by risk measures that are used for regulating the safety of nuclear plants 
and insolvency of insurance companies, but also in financial applications, extremal 
value theory (Embrechts et al, 2000), and catastrophic risk management (Ermoliev et al, 
2000). 
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Section 4 analyzes the effects of uncertain costs and random duration of stages. 
It emphasizes the importance of quantiles of probability distributions characterizing key 
uncertainties and shows that without aggressive ex ante commitments, a misperception 
of limited adaptive second-stage capacity may provoke a catastrophe (i.e., exceedance 
of the safety constraint).  
Sections 4 and 5 discuss the controversial effects of incomplete learning and 
nonlinear costs, which more strongly and even unconditionally require coexistence of ex 
ante anticipative and ex post adaptive risk-management decisions.  
A more realistic but still linear dynamic two-stage climate change stabilization 
STO model will be analyzed in Section 6. Similar to Section 3, the explicit 
incorporation of ex ante and ex post decisions induces risk aversions characterized by a 
dynamic version of a CVaR type risk measure. This may create a wrong impression of 
truly risk-based policy analysis and, without explicit introduction of adaptive capacity 
and additional safety constraints, may provoke a catastrophe. In conclusion, Section 7 
emphasizes the importance of the proper treatment of uncertainty, risks, and robust 
decisions, as well as the development of adequate computational approaches.  
2.  Endogenous Climate Change Risk 
Climate change integrated assessment models (see, e.g., (Nordhaus, 1994)) incorporate 
economic and geophysical processes that link economic growth models with the 
accumulation of GHG emissions in the atmosphere. The accumulation of CO2 emissions 
is the main driving force behind global climate change. The process involves complex 
interactions between the atmosphere, the upper oceans and the biosphere, and the deep 
oceans. Current integrated assessment models use different carbon cycle 
parameterizations for computing changes in atmospheric concentrations M(t) resulting 
from CO2 emissions )(te (Schultz and Kasting, 1997). In general, these models are of 
the form  
( 1) [ ( ), ( ), ], 0,1,2,....M t f M t e t tβ+ = =  (1) 
where β  is a vector of model parameters. Values )(tM  are used in integrated 
assessment models to compute the increase in the global average temperature as a 
smooth function of )(tM , and damages are typically computed in the form of smooth 
functions of this temperature increase. The resulting smooth dependence of damage 
functions on global average temperature does not permit the proper modeling of abrupt 
climate changes. A serious underestimation of climate change impacts may also result 
from the use of average global temperature. It is possible that changes in average global 
temperature would be associated with an increase in the frequency of extreme weather-
related events or could trigger singular events with widespread consequences (e.g., the 
disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (O’Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002)). 
Therefore, proper modeling of risks is crucial for evaluating climate-change policies.  
Emissions )(te  in (1) depend on a vast variety of uncertainties, denoted by ω , 
and policy variables, denoted by x . In this paper, we assume that emissions ( , )e t ω , 
,...1,0=t , are characterized as random variables defined in a probability space Ω  of 
scenarios ω , ω∈Ω , with a probability measure ( )P dω . Thus, for {1,..., }NΩ= , 
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( ) ( ) : P[ ]P d p s sω ω= = = , 
1
( ) 1N
s
p s
=
=∑ . Frequently we do not indicate the 
dependence of random variables on ω  if this is clear from the context.  
We introduce risk by imposing a safety constraint in the form of an atmospheric 
stabilization target, beyond which it is assumed that the risks of high-impact outcomes 
substantially increase. Let us denote by ( )L ω  the uncertain target level of CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere. The main problem can be formulated as the choice of a 
cost-efficient emission-reduction path that satisfies probabilistic safety constraints on 
vital but uncertain levels of concentrations 
P ( , , ) ( ), 1, 1M t x L t Tω ω γ⎡ ⎤≤ = ≥ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , (2) 
where γ  is a risk factor, 0 1γ≤ < , T  is a time horizon that may also be uncertain. In 
the insurance industry, constraints of type (2) regulate risk reserves to prevent 
insolvency. The typical approach to choosing γ in this industry is not based primarily on 
evaluating potential damages, but rather on limiting the chance that the insolvency may 
occur to, say, once in 800 years, 800/1=γ . Similarly, the major failure of a nuclear 
plant is allowed once in 107 years, 710−=γ . Note that these are expected time horizons, 
and therefore there is the possibility that events may occur at any time. 
The concentration-stabilization problem can be formulated in a similar way to 
the catastrophic risk management problem discussed in (Ermoliev et al, 2000). At stage 
1, the emission-reduction path is defined by ex ante decisions )(tx , ,...2,1=t  until a 
random time moment τ  when new information about uncertain variables is revealed. 
The new information may also include a new critical time horizon ( )T ω  for stage 2 ex 
post emission reductions ( , )x t ω , 1,..., ( )t Tτ ω= + . The problem is to minimize total 
emission reduction cost. 
The resulting model can only be solved numerically. Here, instead of using 
numerical simulations, we take a different approach. In the following sections we 
formulate various stylized elements of the model and evaluate them analytically. This 
allows us to keep the discussion on a simple level, which provides a clear picture of the 
potential results. 
Remark 1: The abrupt climate change in (2) is modeled by random ( )L ω , which 
is revealed as a “shock” at random moment ( )τ ω . Despite a smooth and even linear 
dependence of function ( , , )M t x ω  on x , the left-hand side of (2) is, in general, a 
nonsmooth and often even  a discontinuous risk function (Ermoliev and Norkin, 1997; 
Ermoliev and Wets, 1998; Marti, 2005). Endogenous catastrophic collapse is modeled 
as a violation of constraint (2). In general, the learning may not reveal full information 
but perhaps only shift ranges of probability distributions. The learning may also not 
occur at ( ) Tτ ω ≤ , or it may occur very close to ( )T ω . Since the inertia of the system 
may not allow constraints (2) to be fulfilled quickly, the probability of a catastrophe 
conditional on revealed information may drop rapidly below the vital level γ  (i.e., 
constraint (2) emphasizes the importance of proper ex ante actions).  
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3.  Linear Cost Functions 
The following two-stage model is relatively easy to analyze. It provides suggestive 
results and serves as a building block of more general two-stage dynamic models 
(Section 7). Even in its simplest form, it already shows that results from purely 
empirical models can be contradictory regarding the effects of learning on ex ante 
decisions, since optimal solutions depend on complex nonlinear interactions among 
decisions, costs, and probability distributions that characterize uncertainties. 
3.1.  Two-stage model 
A stylized climate change stabilization problem can be formulated as follows: assume 
that there are only two time intervals or periods 2,1=t .  Define by tx , 0≥tx , 2,1=t , a 
feasible level of emission reduction that can be chosen in period t ; tC , 0tC >  is the 
known expected abatement cost per unit of emission reduction in period t ; ( )θ ω  is the 
uncertain target value of cumulative emission reductions for two periods. In this 
problem formulation, ( )θ ω  serves as the safety constraint, 1 2 ( )x x θ ω+ ≥ . The 
constraint on minimum emissions reduction can be thought of as a concise way to 
represent several factors (and their uncertainties) that come into play in meeting a target 
based on environmental outcomes such as atmospheric concentrations, global average 
temperature levels, or particular impacts. For example, emissions reductions required to 
meet a target will depend on the target itself (i.e., whether a concentration or 
temperature target is high or low), on reference emissions e(t) (because the absolute size 
of required emissions reductions will depend on the magnitude of uncontrolled 
emissions in the reference case), and on the system mapping emissions to environmental 
outcomes (e.g., parameters of the carbon cycle or climate system). Uncertainty in 
( )θ ω can be thought of as reflecting uncertainty in one or more of these different 
factors. 
Assume uncertainty in ( )θ ω is resolved between periods 1 and 2. The ex ante 
decision 1x  is made before the uncertainty in θ  is resolved, whereas the ex post decision 
2x  is based on known θ  (i.e., 2x  is a function of θ , 2 ( )x θ ). Assume that the ability to 
fulfill risk constraint 1 2 ( )x x θ ω+ ≥  in period 2 is unbounded. The impacts of this 
rather unrealistic assumption (which is often a standard assumption of existing 
integrated assessment model) are analyzed in Section 4. The problem is formulated as 
the minimization of total linear costs 
1 1 2 2( )C x C Ex θ+  (3) 
subject to safety constraints  
1 2 ( )x x θ θ+ ≥ , for all θ . (4) 
Clearly, if the ex ante decision 1x  is irreversible, then the optimal period 2 
decision is { }1*2 ( ) max 0,x xθ θ= − , that is,  it nonsmoothly depends on period 1 
decision 1x  (path dependence) and θ , providing potentially strong cross-period random 
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interactions among decisions. Optimal period-1 decision *1x  solves the stochastic 
minimax problem: minimize  
{ }1 2( ) max 0,F x C x C E xθ= + − , 0≥x . (5) 
Remark 2: Although the initial model (3)-(4) is linear in ),( 21 xx , the 
introduction of ex post decision 2x  induces risk aversion among ex ante decisions that is 
defined by implicit nonsmooth (in general) function (5). The following Proposition 
summarizes some important facts about stochastic minimax problem (5). It shows that 
the induced risk attitudes are characterized by VaR (critical quantile) and CVaR risk 
measures (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000). In extremal value theory (Embrechts et al, 
2000), CVaR is also known as Mean Shortfall and Mean Excess Loss. 
Proposition: 
(i) )(xF  is a convex function. If [ ]( ) PH z zθ= ≤  is a continuously differentiable 
function, then )(xF  is a strictly convex continuously differentiable function. 
(ii) If 1 2C C> , then 0*1 =x  and θθ =)(*2x . If 1 2C C< , then the necessary and 
sufficient condition for optimal *x  reads: *x  is the quantile satisfying equation  
[ ] 1 2/P x C Cθ≥ = . (6) 
(iii) The optimal value )( *xF  has two important representations: 
[ ] )(|)( *2**11* xIECxxECCxF ≥=≤−+= θθθθθ , (7) 
where ]|[ ⋅⋅E  denotes the conditional expectation, the indicator function ( ) 1I xθ> =  if 
xθ≥
 and ( ) 0I xθ≥ =  otherwise.  
 Let us outline the proof.  
(i) The convexity of )(xF  follows from the convexity of function { }max 0, xθ−  which 
is preserved under expectation operation. The strict convexity of )(xF  follows from the 
continuous differentiability of )(xF . 
(ii) The minimization of )(xF  is a specific case of so-called stochastic minimax 
problems [10]. From the general results it follows that [ ]1 2( )F x C C P xθ′ = − ≥ . From 
21 CC < , it  follows that 0)0( <′F , i.e., * 0x >  (assuming 0* =x  we can derive a 
contradiction with assumption 21 CC <  for small x ). As )(xF  is a strictly convex 
function, it follows that (6) is indeed a necessary and sufficient optimality condition. 
(iii) The first representation in (7) follows from (6) and the following rearrangements: 
{ }
( ) ( )
* * * * * * *
1 2 1 2
* * * * * *
1 1 1 1
( ) max 0, |
          | | .
F x C x C E x C x C E x x P x
C x C E x E x x C C E x x
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − = + − > > =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − − − ≤ = + − ≤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 7
The second representation in (7) follows from (6) and 
)()(},0max{ **** xPxxIExE ≥−≥=− θθθθ . 
Remark 3: The critical quantile in (6) defines the VaR risk measure, i.e., it 
indicates the magnitude of emission reduction in stage 1 that, with probability 1- C1/C2, 
will be sufficient to meet the safety constraint with no additional reduction required in 
stage 2. The second equation in (7) defines the CVaR risk measure; i.e., the expected 
value of abatement costs that will be necessary in stage 2 if emissions reductions in 
stage 1 are not sufficient to meet the safety constraint. For some distributions it is 
possible to derive *x  from (6) explicitly. If θ  is uniformly distributed on ],[ ba , then it 
is easy to see that b
C
C
a
C
C
x ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+=
2
1
2
1* 1  (i.e., *x  is between optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios of emissions with weights defined by ratio of costs 1C  and 2C ). 
3.2.  Comparative analysis 
The Proposition of Section 3.1 allows the comparison of cases of perfect information, 
full uncertainty, and uncertainty with learning. Equation (6) shows the critical 
dependence of period 1 optimal decision on the probability distribution H . Assume that 
21 CC < . In the case of perfect information, i.e., when θ  is known at the beginning of 
the first period, both 1x  and 2x  can be chosen as a function of observable θ . Clearly, 
the optimal solution is θ=*1x , 0*2 =x . Thus, the first term θ1C  of the first equation in 
(7) represents the expected cost under perfect information. The second term represents 
the expected value of perfect information because this cost would be eliminated if θ  
were known before the first-period emission-reduction decision had to be made (rather 
than afterward as in the learning case). In the case of full uncertainty (“without 
learning”), the optimal decision θ=1x , 02 =x  is also known as the certainty 
equivalent. The possibility of learning combined with explicit introduction of ex post 
decisions specifies optimal period 1 abatements by the quantile satisfying (6). It may 
exceed the certainty equivalent θ  or it may be below this level. As equation (6) shows, 
this depends on the relative values of costs 1C , 2C , and the probability distribution H . 
For example, if 2/1/ 21 =CC  and θ  has a normal distribution, then optimal ex ante 
abatement coincides with the certainty equivalent θ=*1x . For non-normal probability 
distributions, the optimal abatements can be below or above θ .1  
Remark 4: The certainty equivalent solution in the case of full uncertainty (no learning) 
does not satisfy (4) for all θ ,  which may lead to a catastrophic collapse of high 
probability. The only way to fulfill the safety constraint (4) is to choose 1x  from the 
                                                 
1
 An asymmetric probability distribution can be caused, for example, by the interaction of a symmetric 
probability distribution with an environmental constraint.  For example, if the probability density function 
for e(ω) is normal, the distribution for θ(ω) can still be asymmetric if there is an atmospheric 
concentration constraint that does not require emissions reductions for all ω. 
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worst-case scenario as max ( )
ω
θ ω , ω ∈Ω . Clearly, this is an unrealistic and extremely 
costly solution. This calls for the explicit introduction of safety constraint (2) to provide 
a trade-off between cost effectiveness and risk. The optimal solution under full 
uncertainty is now defined as minimal 1x , γxx =1 , satisfying equation 
1[ ] 1P x θ γ≥ = −  (since 21 CC < , 02 =x ). Clearly, the risk-based solution under full 
uncertainty γxx =1  may be greater or less than θ , depending on γ , 21 / CC , and 
probability distribution H . Imperfect learning (Section 4.2) may shift the ranges (the 
support) of the probability distribution requiring ex ante abatement that is more or less-
aggressive than γx . 
4.  Uncertain Costs and Outcomes 
4.1.  Uncertain cost 
This section illustrates that the use of expected costs (a common assumption of standard 
integrated assessment models (Wright and Erickson, 2003)) can be misleading, which 
calls for the use of quantiles rather than expectations. Assume that stage 2 cost 2C  in 
(3) is observable (ex-post) random variable, 2( )C ω , 2 2( )C EC ω= , 1 0C > , 2 0C > . 
Function (5) is written as })(,0max{)()( 21 xECxCxF −+= ωθω . The optimal ex ante 
abatements satisfy equation 0)()()( 21' =≥−= xIECCxF θω , i.e., risk attitudes 
induced among ex ante decisions are now characterized by more complicated risk 
measures than the CVaR risk measure of Section 3.1. Let us simplify the analysis by 
assuming as in Arrow and Fisher, (1974) that dθ= , where d  is a known 
(deterministic) positive number. Then, without learning of cost 2 ( )C ω , the problem is to 
minimize the expected cost 1 1 2 2C x C x+ , where 1 2x x d+ = , 01 ≥x , 02 ≥x . If 
21 CC < , then the solution dx =
*
1 , 0
*
2 =x  is optimal. The ability to learn before the 
period 2 decision is made implies that a decision maker may reject emissions reduction 
in period 1, with a likelihood given by the probability that 2 1( )C Cω < . This poses the 
important question about the applicability of expected costs, which is also the key issue 
for evaluating the potential catastrophic impacts characterized by skewed and 
multimodal distributions (see, e.g., Figures 5, 7 in Ermoliev et al, 2000). This requires 
the use of quantiles, say, the median rather then expected values. 
Consider random two-period costs ))(( 1211 xdCxC −+ ω . The median of 
))(( 1211 xdCxC −+ ω  is ))(( 1211 xdmedCxC −+ ω . Assume that 5.31 =C , 
2( ) 3C ω =−  with probability 1/3, 2( ) 15C ω =  with probability 1/3, and with probability 
1/3 it is uniformly distributed in the interval [2,4]. Thus, 2 ( ) 5EC ω = , 2 ( ) 3medC ω = . 
Therefore, the optimal solution using expectations without learning is dx =*1 , 0
*
2 =x . 
Let us notice that the expected value 2 ( ) 5EC ω =  does not occur in reality, i.e., unlike 
the median it does not belong to the support of the distribution of  2( )C ω . The use of 
the median leads to the optimal solution 0*1 =x , dx =
*
2 , i.e., it reverses the previous 
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conclusion regarding the optimal solution. Assume now that  111 =C , 2 ( ) 5C ω =−  
with probability 1/5, 2 ( ) 5C ω =  with probability 1/5 and with probability 3/5 it is 
uniformly distributed in interval ]16,14[ . In this case, 2 ( ) 9EC ω = , i.e., the optimal 
solution without learning is 0*1 =x , dx =
*
2 . Since  2 ( ) 14medC ω > , then the use of the 
median leads to the opposite optimal solution dx =*1 , 0
*
2 =x . 
Remark 5: An approach for minimizing quantiles follows from Section 3.1. It 
shows that the minimization of a quantile of },0max{)(211 xCxC −+ βω  can be 
reduced to minimization of a convex function 
1 2max{0, ( ) max{0, } }y E C x C x yµ ω β+ + − −  with respect to ),( yx . The solution of 
this STO problem ),( ** yx  satisfies constraints  
µ
βω 1]},0max{)([ 21 =≥−+ yxCxCP .  
4.2.  Uncertain durations of stages: Limited adaptive capacity 
The general two-stage problem (Section 2) with constraint (2) has a random duration of 
stages. There are at least two reasons this duration may be uncertain. First, in cases with 
learning, the timing of new information may be uncertain. For example, if learning is 
slow, the second period may occur late, while if learning is fast the second period will 
begin early. In addition, inertia in socio-economic systems may affect the duration of 
stages. For example, a given emissions reduction in period 1 may take a long time in 
systems with substantial inertia, but less time in more flexible systems (Ha-Duong et al, 
1997). The path-dependencies (inertia) of the socio-economic systems producing 
greenhouse gasses are critical for dealing with abrupt changes. Without inertia, the 
switching from one emission path to another would be instantaneous. In reality, energy 
production systems cannot be changed overnight. As a result, preparedness programs 
may be only partially implemented because of the potential lack of time in both stages. 
The proper treatment of these effects requires the explicit introduction of random 
durations of stages. The following show that a delay with proper ex ante abatements 
may result in a violation of constraint (2).  
In its simplest form, the uncertain duration of stages can be modeled by 
constraints β≤2x  with positive random β  which becomes known from learning at 
stage 2. In other words, it is assumed that the uncertain duration of stage one (with fixed 
two period time horizon  T ) affects the capacity for reductions in period 2 (for example, 
a longer period 1 reduces the scope for reductions in period 2 given its shorter duration). 
Without the safety constraint of type (2), the optimal stage 2 decision 
{ }12 min ,max 0,x xβ θ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  cannot in general satisfy safety constraints (4) for all θ . As 
a consequence, the probability of a catastrophe can be rather high, calling for explicit 
introduction of type (2) safety constraint [ ]1 2 1P x x θ γ+ ≥ = − . Since 2x β≤ , this 
requires ex-ante emission reduction commitments γxx ≥1 , where γx  is minimal non-
negative x  satisfying equation  [ ] 1P x θ β γ≥ − = − . Therefore, in order to prevent a 
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catastrophic collapse, there must exist regulations on minimal ex-ante emission 
reductions sufficient to keep open the possibility of satisfying the safety constraint in 
stage 2, which can be evaluated by analyzing STO problems with safety constraints (2). 
4.3.  Incomplete learning and safety constraints 
Consider a very realistic case where the learning affects only the prior distribution 
)(zH , in other words, it shifts the range of uncertainty.  As the optimal period 1 
decision of Section 3.1 is a quantile of  )(zH , learning may dramatically affect this 
decision in different directions. Let us assume that ( ) [ ]H z P zθ= ≤  is a mixture 
∫== )(),(),()( ydGzyHzHEzH ξξ  of distribution ),( zH ξ  with unknown ξ  
characterized by a probability distribution ( ) [ ]G y P yξ= ≤ , which may reflect 
polarized views on scenarios of climate changes. The learning reveals only ξ  at the 
beginning of period 2.  For example,  )(zH  can be a mixture of distributions ),( zH ξ  
with probability mass concentrated in different subregions from the support of )(zH . If 
the support of  ),( zH ξ  is a singleton, then the learning of ξ  reveals the true value of θ . 
For the sake of illustration, let )(zH  be a mixture of two distributions )(0 zH  and 
)(1 zH , that is, )()1()( 10 zHzH ξξ −+ , where 0=ξ  with probability p  and 1=ξ  with 
probability p−1 , that is, 0 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )H z pH z p H z= + − . Since only ξ  is observed, the 
stage 2 decision )(2 ξx  can not fulfill constraints (4), and the safety constraint has to be 
written as in (2): 
[ ]1 2( ) ( ) 1P x x ξ θ ξ γ+ ≥ ≥ − , (8) 
where ( )θ ξ  has the probability distribution )(zH ξ . For a given ξ  and γ , let us define 
)(ξγz  as minimal z , satisfying equation [ ]( ) 1P z θ ξ γ≥ = − . Then equation (8) is 
equivalent to the equation 1 2( ) ( )x x zγξ ξ+ ≥ , which is similar to (4). The optimal 
period 2 decision { }12 max 0, ( )x z xγ ξ= − , and optimal 1x  has to minimize 
{ } { }1 2( ) max 0, (0) (1 ) max 0, (1)F x C x C p z x p z xγ γ⎡ ⎤= + − + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
As ξ  has a discrete probability distribution, function )(xF  does not have 
continuous derivatives. Therefore, the optimality condition cannot be derived from the 
Proposition of Section 3.1. Assume that )1()0( γγ zz < . )(xF  is a piece-wise continuous 
linear function. Namely, for 0 (0)x zγ≤ < ,  
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ).()1()1()0()( 22121 ξγγγ zCxCCxzpxzpCxCxF +−=−−+−+=  
For (0) (1)z x zγ γ≤ < ,  
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( ) ( )1 2 1 2 2( ) (1 ) (1) (1 ) (1 ) (1)F x C x C p z x C C p x C p zγ γ= + − − = − − + − , and 
for  
)1(γzx ≥ , xCxF 1)( = .  
The optimal ex-ante solution hedges against different contingencies. It is 
characterized as follows: 0=x , if 1 2C C> . Otherwise, )0(γzx = , if 
1 2(1 ) 0C C p− − > , and )1(γzx = , if 1 2(1 ) 0C C p− − < .  
Since 21 CC < , in general it pays to make reductions in period 1 that are as large 
as possible. After learning takes place at the end of period 1, the optimal solution is to 
make reductions such that the total reduction is either )0(z  or )1(z . Thus, the minimal 
first period reduction is )0(z . If first period costs are very low, or the chance that 1=ξ  
is very high, then  it is optimal to make larger first period reduction )1(z , accepting the 
chance that 0=ξ  and that reductions (1) (0)z z−  will have been unnecessary. 
Let us compare this ex ante period 1 optimal “with-learning” solution  with the 
optimal “without-learning” solution  γzx =
∗
1 , 02 =∗x  derived from minimization of (4) 
under safety constraint 1 2[ ] 1P x x θ γ+ ≥ ≥ − , i.e., 1 2x x zγ+ ≥ , where γz  is the 
minimal z  satisfying constraint [ ] 1P z θ γ≥ ≥ − . Assume that )(0 zH , )(1 zH  have 
continuous derivatives, the support of distribution )(0 zH  is interval ],[ 00 ba , and the 
support of )(1 zH  is interval ],[ 11 ba , where 1 0a b> . If 1 2(1 ) 0C C p− − < , then the 
optimal “with-learning” period 1 solution )1(γzx = . If ],[ 11 bax∈ , then 
[ ] 1(1 ) ( )P x p p H xθ≥ = + − . Since γγ −= 1))1((1 zH , then 
[ ] (1 )(1 ) 1P x p p pθ γ γ γ≥ = + − − = − +  for )1(γzx = . As 0pγ > , then the optimal 
“without-learning” decision x γθ=   satisfying [ ] 1P x θ γ≥ = −  is less demanding 
(smaller) than )1(γzx = , i.e., learning increases the optimal ex ante emission 
reductions. This conclusion is reversed in the case 1 2(1 ) 0C C p− − > . Indeed, let 
],[ 00 bax∈ . Then, [ ] 0( )P x pH xθ≥ = , 0( (0)) 1H zγ γ= −  and for )0(γzx = , 
[ ] (1 )P x pθ γ≥ = −  (i.e., the optimal “without-learning” decision x γθ=  is greater than 
the optimal “with-learning” decision )0(γzx = ).  
5.  Nonlinear Abatement Cost 
It is well known that abatement-cost functions are nonlinear (Ha-Duong et al, 1997). 
This section illustrates that, in contrast to the linear case, nonlinear cost functions call 
more strongly for the coexistence of ex ante and ex post decisions. It is interesting to 
compare the case of linear functions with the quadratic cost functions used in some 
integrated assessment models. Assume that the cost functions of both periods 
2)( xCxC ii =  with positive 1C , 2C . Cost function (4) takes on the form  
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{ }( )
22
1 2( ) max 0,F x C x C E xθ= + −  and ( )1 2( ) 2 2 [ ]F x C x C E x I xθ θ′ = − − ≥ . 
Therefore, 2(0) 2 0F C Eθ′ =− < , assuming that 0Eθ>  with a positive probability. 
Thus, this case calls for coexistence of period 1 and period 2 decisions independently of 
1C , 2C . Compare this to the case of linear costs in Section 3.1, where 1 2(0)F C C′ = −  
if 21 CC < ; i.e., non-zero first period reductions are called for only if costs are less in 
period 1. With quadratic costs, period 1 reductions are optimal even if 1 2C C>  because 
marginal costs can still be lower in period 1 if larger period 2 reductions will be 
required.  
Optimal ex ante abatements are characterized by more complicated than (6) 
equation 1 2 ( ) ( )C x C E x I xθ θ= − ≥ . In the case of normally distributed θ , 
2
2
2
1 )(2
1)( xECxCxF −+= θ . From the optimality 1 22 ( ) 0C x C x Eθ+ − =  it follows 
that optimal )2/( 212 CCCx += θ , i.e., it is defined only by mean value θ . This 
conclusion is false for non-normal distributions, although standard integrated 
assessment models often use only average values θ . 
It is important to illustrate some typical situations that may occur in the case of 
non-smooth, piece-wise linear functions commonly used in emission-control problems 
where technology switches may call for more intensive emission reduction. These 
functions implicitly impose upper or lower bounds on ex ante emission reductions. 
Assume that xCxC 22 )( =  and )(1 xC  is a piece-wise linear function xCxC 111 )( =  for 
0 x a≤ ≤  and aCaxCxC 11211 )()( +−=  for ax ≥ , where 221 CC >  and 211 CC < . It is 
easy to see that the optimal ex ante solution has to satisfy the additional requirement 
ax ≤1 . As 2
1
1 CC <  and 221 CC > , the optimal ex ante decision is defined as follows: 
let x  be the solution of equation 2
1
1 /][ CCxP =>θ . The optimal period 1 decision 
ax =∗1  if ax > , and xx =∗1  for x a≤ . Assume that xCxC 11 )( = , and xCxC 122 )( =  
for 0 x a≤ ≤ ; aCaxCxC 12222 )()( +−=  for ax ≥ , where 121 CC > , 221 CC < . Consider 
solution x   of the equation 2
1
1 /][ CCxP =>θ . It is easy to see that the optimal period-1 
decision xx =∗1  for ax ≥  and 01 =∗x  for ax < .  
 
6.  A Dynamic Stabilization Problem 
The general stabilization problem is outlined in Section 2. Its proper formulation 
requires a catastrophe-generating submodel (i.e., a submodel of CO2-generating 
activities). Therefore, in its rather general form, the problem becomes similar to 
catastrophic-risk-management problems discussed in [9]. In its simplest form, the 
dynamic two-stage model has strong connections with dynamic versions of CVaR risk 
measures.  
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Assume that CO2 emission paths are characterized by exogenous scenarios as in 
Section 3. Let us consider ∑= =tk kt xR 0 , where decision variables 0≥kx , tk ,..,1,0= , 
t T≤ . We can think of kx  as a feasible level of CO2 emission reduction at the 
beginning of period k . At time 0=t   the target value on total emission reduction tR  in 
period t  is given as a random variable tρ . It is assumed that the exact value of tρ  is 
revealed at a random time τ=t . Since τ  is uncertain, the decision path 
),...,,( 10 Txxxx =  for the whole time horizon has to be chosen ex ante in period 0t =  to 
“hit” the target tρ , ττ ρ≥R , at τ=t  in a sense specified further by (10). At random 
τ=t , the decision path can be revised for the remaining available time. Similar to the 
model of Section 3.1, consider a stream of linear random costs 
∑ −+=
= =
T
t tttttt IRdxcxv 0 }],0max{[)( τρ , where 0tc > , 0td > , Tt ,...,1,0=  are 
known ex-ante and ex-post abatement costs.  The expected value of ( )xν  can be written 
as 
{ }0 0( ) max 0,
T
t t tt t
V x c x Ed xττ τρ= == + −∑ ∑ .  (9) 
Let us consider a path *x  minimizing )(xV  subject to 0≥tx , Tt ,...,1,0= . 
Assume that ( )V x  is a continuously differentiable function (e.g., a component of 
random vector 0 1( , ,..., )Tρ ρ ρ ρ=   has a continuous density function). Assume also that, 
so far, there exists a positive optimal solution ),...,,( **1*0* Txxxx = , 0* >tx , Tt ,...,1,0= . 
Then, from the optimality condition for stochastic minimax problems (see, e.g., 
discussion in [4], [10]), it follows that for *xx = , 
( )∑ ∑ ≤−=
= =
t
k
t
k kkkktx xEIdpcV t 0 0 ρ  or  
0 0
P[ ] 0
t
t t
x t k k k kk k
V c p d x ρ
= =
= − ≤ =∑ ∑ , Tt ,...,1,0= , where tp  is the probability 
that τ  occurs first time at t . From this sequentially for Tt ,...,1,0= ,  it follows that  
00000 /][ dpcxP =< ρ , ttttktk k dpccxP /)(][ 10 −= −=<∑ ρ , Tt ,...,1,0= . (10)  
It is easy to see that from (9) it follows that 
[ ] [ ] [ ])()(...)()()()( *1*1101*0000* TTTTTi RIEccRIEccRIEcxV >−++>−+>= − ρρρρρρ
which can be viewed as a dynamic CVaR risk measure. 
Remark 6: Equations (9) are derived from the existence of the positive optimal 
solution *x .  It is easy to see that this solution follows from 1/ 000 <dpc , 
1( ) / 1t t t tc c p d−− <  and the monotonicity of quantiles tβ , 0 1 ... Tβ β β< < <  defined by 
equations  
0 0 0 0 0[ ] /P c p dβ ρ< = , 1[ ] ( ) /t t t t t tP c c p dβ ρ −< = − , Tt ,...,1,0= . 
 14
If probability tp  rapidly decreases to 0, then from (9) it follows that ex-ante 
abatements are positive for a relatively short initial interval defined by inequality 
1/)( 1 <− − tttt dpcc . This misleading conclusion is due to a strong assumption of 
unlimited capacity for emissions reductions, which is a standard assumption of climatic-
economic integrated assessment models (see discussion in Ha-Duong, 1997 and Wright 
and Erickson, 2003). Similar to conclusions of Section 4.2, this requires an adequate 
treatment of safety constraints (2) to prevent catastrophes. 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzes the effects of risks and learning on climate change decisions using a 
two-stage, dynamic model that assumes a stabilization constraint.  It shows that learning 
can lead either to larger or smaller first period emissions reductions, compared to the 
optimal reduction under uncertainty without learning, and that this effect can either be 
large or small.  The direction and magnitude of the learning effect is determined by a 
number of interacting factors.  For example, in a simple linear model with deterministic 
mitigation costs but uncertainty in total required emissions reductions, the learning 
effect depends on how mitigation costs evolve over time, the shape of the uncertainty 
distribution in required emissions reductions, the confidence with which the safety 
constraint (i.e., stabilization level) is desired to be met, and, in the case of incomplete 
learning, the probability distribution describing the anticipated learning possibilities.  If 
costs are uncertain, but the emissions reduction target is known, the problem 
emphasizes the use of risk adjusted costs (e.g., quantiles) rather than expected values. 
Introducing a more realistic nonlinear cost function with increasing marginal costs 
induces a higher level of first period emissions reductions compared to the linear case.  
We also analyze the case of random duration of stages as a proxy either for uncertain 
timing of learning or uncertain inertia in socio-economic systems, showing how this 
consideration can induce a minimum level of first period reductions.  Finally, framing 
the problem in dynamic terms as a multi-period problem with an uncertain time path of 
required cumulative emissions reductions shows that the problem has strong 
connections with dynamic versions of VaR risk measures. Given the multiple influences 
on the learning effect, we conclude that drawing practical conclusions on the likely 
effect of learning on climate change decisions is an empirical question requiring 
analysis with models capable of adequately representing endogenous risks, abrupt 
changes, in particular, abrupt learning, inertia, and path dependent costs. 
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